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Social protection systems have to cope with large
discrepancies between the financing needed to cover demand
and the resources actually available. For this reason, it is
necessary for any reform proposal to include elements of
cost restraint as well as measures to increase the population
coverage of systems. Efficiency and solidarity must improve
together if progress is to be made towards universality of
benefits. Any reform strategy needs to consider not only the
financial constraints imposed by the macroeconomy, but also
the heavy drain on financial resources and the effects on the
fiscal accounts that may result from whatever scheme is
chosen owing to the amount and volume of benefits, the
limited scope for funding them out of contributions, and the
need for redistributive financing. This article looks at various
approaches to social security finance reform, involving new
and different public-private mixes.
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Demand for health services and pensions (and for other
social protection benefits) is now growing considerably
faster than actual gross domestic product (GDP) or any
forecast for GDP, however optimistic. This has led to
mounting tension between the financial requirements
of social security and the capacity of countries to
provide the resources demanded.
This being so, reform of social protection systems
has come to be a core part of the political agenda in
most countries. In the region, the need for change results
simultaneously from two considerations. First, there are
the failings and difficulties that have beset social
protection (social insurance and the public sector) in
the past and the new challenges raised by demographic
and epidemiological trends and technological
developments. Second, these internal challenges are
being compounded by globalization, which the
countries of the region are now undergoing and which
has affected the nature of the protection system and its
ability to respond to the external shocks faced by our
economies. In particular, the financial volatility of the
1990s has had major repercussions for the countries’
business cycles, increasing social risk and the need for
social protection mechanisms (Rodrik, 2001; ECLAC,
2001a). Companies have adapted to greater economic
instability by adjusting their workforces, and this has
resulted in growing insecurity of employment at the
national level, weakening the contribution base of social
protection systems.1
From the outset, social protection systems have
been regarded as social entitlements. Their objectives
include combating poverty, discrimination and social
risks (United Nations, 2002). Reforms intended to
modernize these systems still have to meet three historic
challenges: i) universalizing social security; ii) reducing
marked inequities in service access and quality, and iii)
improving the social return on the resources allocated
to these activities by changing the way they are
managed and assigned. Reforms need to be designed
to strengthen social security systems so that the
insurance structure can be adapted to the new needs
and realities of society and the economy, particularly
changes in labour markets.
In this article, it  will be argued that the
heterogeneity of labour markets and the volatility and
uncertainty of the economic environment have
increased social risk. Social security systems need to
combine insurance and saving schemes with
redistribution and solidarity. Since any progress
towards universal coverage and guaranteed benefits
means greater financial demands on the State, reforms
need to succeed in reconciling social and fiscal
responsibilities. One example of these demands is the
growth of contingent liabilities generated in the public
sector, requiring rules for financing them over time
(Arenas de Mesa and Guzmán, 2003). If it is to
support social policies, macroeconomic policy should
not only be concerned with smoothing out business
cycles but should also generate fiscal expenditure
rules that include scope for countercyclical public
spending compatible with the basis of this policy. The
design of the public-private mix will have a
significant influence on the efficiency and equity of
the social security system, and thence on the demands
made on the treasury. In the case of health systems,
an inappropriate public-private mix leads to problems
of risk selection and exclusion. In the case of
pensions, while the need to replace defined-benefit
systems with defined-contribution ones is recognized,
the design of reform options has major implications
for the costs that have to be met by the treasury during
the transition and for the financing sources of




A version of this paper was presented at the “Macroeconomic
policy and social vulnerability” seminar held in Santiago, Chile, on
26 and 27 November 2002 as part of a project jointly financed by
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and
the Governments of France and Germany. The authors are grateful
for the comments of seminar participants, particularly those made
by Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, José Pablo Arellano and Oscar Altimir
on a preliminary text.
1
 Specifically, this paper will consider how risks relating to health,
old age, disability and death are covered. It does not deal with
unemployment and social exclusion risks, except as they affect
people’s ability to participate in contributory social protection
systems. The average unemployment rate in Latin America rose by
more than four percentage points in the 1990s; according to ECLAC
estimates, seven of every 10 jobs were generated in the informal
sector in that decade.
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The countries of the region have made a considerable
commitment to social spending. As a percentage of GDP,
spending rose from 10.4% in 1990-1991 to 14.1% in
2000-2001, showing a modestly countercyclical
tendency (table 1). A significant effort has also been
made with health spending. The region spends an
average of six to seven percentage points of GDP, a figure
that is quite close to the world average and not very far
from the nine or ten points seen in developed countries.2
The increase of almost four percentage points of
GDP in social spending ought to improve risk coverage
for the population, particularly the poorest. This is not
inevitable, however, because spending is not always
concentrated on the lowest-income sectors of society
(table 2).
In the experience of the region, it has proved very
difficult to target social spending on the poorest and/or
widen population coverage. For this reason, social policy
outcomes have not matched spending efforts. Systems
of social security (and of social protection in general)
have been confronted simultaneously with strong growth
in the demand for services and a rise in their production
costs. This growth in financing requirements is occurring
in the midst of increased economic volatility and greater
fiscal constraints in the countries, so that reform proposals
need to aim simultaneously at improving efficiency and
management techniques to hold down costs and at
strengthening solidarity mechanisms, owing to the
precarious levels of so many people’s incomes.
Among the factors determining the demand for
social security services, those associated with the
business cycle can be distinguished from those deriving
from more structural causes. The former are closely
related to the economic growth rate and to
macroeconomic and social policies, while the latter
reflect demographic, epidemiological and technological
aspects.
One of the main ways in which the business cycle
affects social security systems is through its impact
on the labour market. For as long as social security
systems in the Latin American countries follow the
Bismarckian model, access to social protection
systems will be determined by the contractual status
of the worker, and contribution schemes will thus
depend on the dynamics of the labour market. Changes
in this market affect not just the demand for social
services, but also the financing sources used to meet
this demand. With current schemes, for example, the
fact that most work is done in the informal sector has
limited the scope for universalizing social security and
using wage contributions as a principal source of
financing.
Latin American labour markets did not develop
favourably in the 1990s or the first two years of the
2000s. The key developments have been the way in
which the countries’ economies have adjusted to
external shocks, and the weakness and volatility of
growth rates, making it difficult to create jobs for an
economically active population that is growing as a
result of demographic inertia and increased participation
by women in the workforce. In fact, macroeconomic
policy in most of the region’s countries has been
strongly procyclical, while its capacity for using fiscal,
monetary and exchange-rate instruments to adjust to
real or financial shocks from outside has diminished.
Consequently, the burden of adjustment has fallen
increasingly on labour markets in the form of higher
levels of unemployment and informal working.
Vulnerability to unemployment has thus increased, as
has job turnover (a characteristic of private-sector
employment), and a larger proportion of workers are
II
Public-sector social spending
This article will also look at the new context in
which social security systems will have to operate,
review the particular health and pension reforms carried
out by countries in the region, and analyse the policy
challenges arising from the reform process.
2
 Although the difference is significant in per capita terms: while
the developed countries spend almost US$ 1,800 per capita per year,
the countries of the region spend only US$ 370. In general, analysts
find it hard to distinguish how much of this goes on investment and
how much on current spending.
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TABLE 1
Latin America: Total public-sector social spending
(Percentages of GDP)
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001
Latin America 10.4 11.3 12.0 12.3 13.1 14.1
Argentina 19.3 20.1 21.1 20.0 20.8 21.6
Bolivia … … 12.4 1.6 16.3 17.9
Brazil 18.1 17.7 19.3 17.3 19.3 18.8
Chile 11.7 12.4 12.3 13.0 14.7 16.0
Colombia 6.8 8.1 11.5 15.3 14.0 13.6
Costa Rica 15.6 15.2 15.8 16.8 16.4 18.2
Ecuador 5.5 5.8 7.4 8.2 8.1 8.8
El Salvador … 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.1 4.2
Guatemala 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.3 6.0 6.2
Honduras 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.5 10.0
Mexico 6.5 8.1 8.8 8.5 9.2 9.8
Nicaragua 11.1 10.9 12.2 11.3 13.0 13.2
Panama 18.6 19.5 19.8 20.9 21.6 25.5
Paraguay 3.1 6.2 7.0 8.0 8.5 8.5
Peru 4.0 5.3 6.7 7.1 7.7 8.0
Dominican Rep. 4.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.6 7.6
Uruguay 16.9 18.9 20.3 21.3 22.8 23.5
Venezuela 8.5 8.9 7.6 8.3 8.4 11.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
TABLE 2
Latin America: Change in per capita social spending, and percentage
going to the first quintilea
(Percentages)
Country Education Health and nutrition Social security Housing, water, sanitation and others
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
increase going to increase going to increase going to increase going to
over decade poorest 20% over decade poorest 20% over decade poorest 20% over decade poorest 20%
Average 37.2 27.9 25.2 26.9 37.4 15.0 20.4 22.1
Argentina 41.0 32.5 28.7 38.7 20.9 11.0 30.1 20.5
Brazilb 13.9 30.1 4.9 31.5 36.6 42.0 -10.3 30.8
Chile 56.9 34.0 52.4 30.9 39.5 4.0 48.9 37.3
Colombia 48.3 21.4 77.9 17.5 54.5 … 53.8 …
Costa Rica 29.4 15.7 17.1 2.7 31.0 7.1 1.6 …
Guatemala 40.0 … 36.4 … 25.0 … 93.3 …
Honduras -3.1 … -25.0 … … … 40.0 …
Mexico 37.7 … -28.0 … 89.3 … 35.0 …
Nicaragua 15.4 … 0.0 … … … 50.0 …
Panama 36.9 … 2.6 … 13.4 … -26.2 …
Paraguay 66.7 … 73.7 … 54.3 … -300.0 …
Peru 54.8 … 60.5 … 71.3 … 78.6 …
Dominican Rep. 70.2 … 51.6 … 62.5 … 16.1 …
Uruguay 40.4 33.2 18.2 34.9 46.4 12.4 51.5 14.1
Venezuela 7.9 … -16.3 … 5.3 … -100.0 …
Source: ECLAC (2001b), tables IV.5 and IV.7.
a The percentage increases are estimated in relation to the value at the end of the period.
b The education figures are for primary only. Social security includes only pensions. The estimate is for consolidated social spending.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3 103
THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN  SOCIAL PROTECTION •  DANIEL  T ITELMAN AND ANDRAS UTHOFF
not covered for risks, because many jobs are informal
ones that provide no social protection.3
The average unemployment rate in the region
showed a rising trend in the 1990s, peaking at 9% in
2002. Similarly, employment-output elasticity has tended
to decline, so that higher growth rates are required to
generate new jobs. Along with this fall in elasticity, job
security and benefits have tended to deteriorate owing
to the growing importance of informal employment
(table 4). According to estimates by the International
Labour Organization (ILO), seven out of every ten jobs
were generated in the informal sector in the 1990s.
All this means that unemployment insurance will
play an important role in the future, not only as a
stabilizer of internal income but as an important source
of financing for any social security scheme.4
3
 Tokman (2003) identifies three factors that were instrumental in
shifting the burden of adjustment on to the labour market: i) the
reforms introduced to extend the grounds for dismissal and reduce
adjustment times for companies, compounded by asymmetries that
placed a large part of the economic adjustment burden on
employment; ii) privatization, which has helped shift job creation
from the public to the private sector, and iii) a shift in the private-
sector employment structure towards informal and service-sector
jobs and those without contracts or social protection.
4
 This paper will not concern itself with unemployment risk except
insofar as it limits the extension of social protection cover. See
Velásquez (2003) for a recent analysis of unemployment insurance.
TABLE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean: Urban unemploymenta
(Average annual rates)
Area 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Latin America and
the Caribbean 5.8 6.6 7.5 7.5 8.0 7.6 8.1 8.9 8.4 8.4 9.0
Simple average
 for 22 countries … 10.0 9.5 10.1 10.5 9.9 9.7 10.3 10.1 10.3
Latin America
Argentina UA 7.4 9.6 11.5 17.5 17.2 14.9 12.9 14.3 15.1 17.4 19.7
Bolivia DC 7.3 5.8 3.1 3.6 3.8 4.4 6.1 8.0 7.5 8.5
Brazil 6MA 4.3 5.4 5.1 4.6 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 6.2 7.1
Chile NT 7.8 6.5 7.8 7.4 6.4 6.1 6.4 9.8 9.2 9.1 9.0
Colombia 7MA 10.5 8.6 8.9 8.8 11.2 12.4 15.3 19.4 17.2 18.2 17.6
Costa Rica UT 5.4 4.0 4.3 5.7 6.6 5.9 5.4 6.2 5.3 5.8 6.8
Cuba NT … 6.2 6.7 7.9 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.0 5.5 4.1 3.5
Ecuador UT 6.1 8.9 7.8 7.7 10.4 9.3 11.5 15.1 14.1 10.4 8.6
El Salvador UT 10.0 8.1 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.6 6.9 6.5 7.0 7.1
Guatemala NT 6.3 2.6 3.5 3.9 5.2 5.1 3.8 … … … …
Honduras UT 7.8 7.0 4.0 5.6 6.5 5.8 5.2 5.3 … 6.3 6.2
Mexico UA 2.7 3.4 3.7 6.2 5.5 3.7 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.7
Nicaragua NT 7.6 17.8 17.1 16.9 16.0 14.3 13.2 10.7 9.8 10.7 12.9
Panama MR 20.0 15.6 16.0 16.6 16.9 15.5 15.2 14.0 15.2 16.9 16.1
Paraguay UT 6.6 5.1 4.4 5.3 8.2 7.1 6.6 9.4 10.0 10.8 …
Peru ML 8.3 9.9 8.8 8.2 8.0 9.2 8.5 9.2 8.5 9.3 9.4
Dominican Rep. NT … 19.9 16.0 15.8 16.5 15.9 14.3 13.8 13.9 15.6 16.1
Uruguay UT 8.5 8.3 9.2 10.3 11.9 11.5 10.1 11.3 13.6 15.3 17.0
Venezuela NT 10.4 6.6 8.7 10.3 11.8 11.4 11.3 14.9 14.0 13.4 15.9
Caribbean
Barbados NT 14.7 24.3 21.9 19.7 15.6 14.5 12.3 10.4 9.2 9.9 10.5
Jamaica NT 15.3 16.3 15.4 16.2 16.0 16.5 15.5 15.7 15.5 15.0 …
Trinidad and Tobago NT 20.1 19.8 18.4 17.2 16.2 15.0 14.2 13.1 12.8 11.1 11.0
Source: ECLAC (2002a).
a UA: urban areas; NT: national total; DC: departmental capitals; MA: metropolitan areas; UT: urban total; ML: metropolitan Lima; MR:
metropolitan region. The simple averages for 1999, 2000 and 2001 are adjusted to compensate for missing data. The figures for all Latin
America in the first halves of 2001 and 2002 are weighted averages for the countries with information available.
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One significant factor affecting the labour market
and the design of social security systems is the need
for technological change and greater competitiveness
resulting from participation in the international
economy. The need to adapt the production structure
to a situation in which economies have opened up
internationally means that greater labour mobility is
required among the different production sectors, so that
the new production requirements can be met.
Although desirable, increased labour mobility
among sectors and greater competitiveness should not
be achieved at the expense of social security. On the
contrary, one challenge for the reforms is to reconcile
the mechanisms and costs of insurance with the needs
of labour mobility and competitiveness. Insofar as social
protection systems facilitate labour mobility among
competitive production sectors, they will improve the
capacity of the labour market to respond to external
shocks. What is required for this, particularly where
health and pensions are concerned, are portable social
security benefits financed from assets acquired at
competitive costs.
The increased volatility observed in the business
cycle has brought with it greater instability in income
levels, resulting in a higher percentage of persons facing
social and economic risk. This has meant both a
reduction in people’s capacity to pay contributions and
an increase in the demand for insurance and social
protection. Under these circumstances, social security
systems need to reconcile the functions of insurance,
to cope with the increase in economic risk, with those
of distribution and solidarity, to be able to provide
universal cover against those risks.
It is here that the level and composition of public
spending, especially in the area of social protection,
can serve to stabilize internal income levels and thus
act as insurance against social risks in economies
exposed to powerful and frequent external shocks.
Rodrik (1998) shows a positive correlation between the
international integration of an economy and the size of
the State. In other words, the greater the degree of
international openness, the higher public spending is
found to be, whether for consumption or for social
security.5
The main macroeconomic advances in the 1990s
include the consolidation of fiscal accounts and the
fall in inflation. Where fiscal adjustment is concerned,
the deficit held steady for most of the decade at an
average of some 1.6% of GDP, although during the
recent crisis (1997-2002), when the severity of certain
countries’ fiscal problems came to light, it rose to
figures in excess of 3% of GDP. Success in keeping
the fiscal deficit down to moderate levels has proved
consistent, however, with a recovery in public
expenditure levels (tables 1 and 5).
Despite the fiscal achievements, procyclical
management of tax policy has adversely affected the
ability of countries to finance social security services
when demand for them has risen in periods of recession.
The evolution of social spending has followed the
vagaries of economic growth, so that the loss of revenue
during downturns has prevented coverage from being
expanded (or maintained) by means of increased fiscal
spending. If it is to underpin social protection policy,
therefore, macroeconomic policy needs to concern itself
not just with smoothing out business cycles but also
with producing fiscal expenditure rules that provide
scope for countercyclical public spending. This being
so, rules to link fiscal goals with structural parameters
rather than temporary conditions in the economy are
an important element in social policy. This is
particularly true in the new climate of vulnerability and
volatility within which the Latin American economies
now operate.
5
 The degree of economic openness is measured by the ratio of






Total Informal sector Formal sector
1990 2001 1990 2001
Latin America 100 42.8 46.3 57.2 53.7
Argentina 100 52.0 45.7 48.0 54.3
Brazil 100 40.6 46.0 59.4 54.0
Chile 100 37.9 38.0ª 62.1 62.0ª
Colombia 100 45.7 55.6 54.3 44.4
Costa Rica 100 41.2 44.9 58.8 55.1
Ecuador 100 55.6 57.4 44.4 42.6
Honduras 100 57.6 60.7b 42.4 39.2b
Mexico 100 38.4 39.6 61.6 60.4
Panama 100 36.0 37.3ª 64.0 62.7ª
Peru 100 52.7 59.5 47.3 40.5
Uruguay 100 39.1 42.2 60.9 57.8
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It is common for social protection systems to have to
cope with serious discrepancies between the financial
resources needed and the funding actually available to
meet demand. The result is that cost constraint is a key
element in any effort to reform systems, even in
industrialized economies that set out from a system of
social protection with universal coverage. In Latin
America the situation is more serious, as cost constraint
is not the only challenge for reform. The need to bring
large sections of the population into social security
systems makes it essential to move towards a
universality of benefits. Consequently, both efficiency
and solidarity are essential parts of any reform agenda.
This is why the relationship between financing and
provision of benefits is so important in Latin American
reforms. It will not only affect the working of health
and pension systems but, as efforts are made to extend
coverage to sectors unable to contribute, will also have
a major effect on the public finances. For this reason,
any reform strategy needs to consider not only the
financial constraints imposed by the macroeconomy,
but also the major repercussions that the implemented
design may have on the demand for fiscal resources,
and thence on the fiscal accounts.
This is of vital importance, since reforms in most
of the region’s countries envisage major changes in the
public-private mix, with greater private-sector
involvement in managing the financing of contributory
regimes and service provision. How the public-private
mix is configured in social security systems affects the
distributive function of the State. To attain objectives
of equity, solidarity and efficiency, then, it is necessary
to improve existing institutions and/or create new ones,
and this will have a significant effect on the financial
needs of the public sector.
1. Reforms to health system financing
a) The organization of financing
In the case of health systems, the international
evidence shows that spending more does not always
bring better results. The United States spends about 13%
of GDP on health care, and its population coverage and
health indicators are worse than those of the other
Where social protection is concerned, structural
changes can be foreseen that owe nothing to the
business cycle and are likely to lead to a substantial
increase in the demand for social services. These include
population ageing, changes in epidemiological
characteristics, technological changes (particularly in
the area of health) and changes in the structure of
households.
III
Health and pension reforms
TABLE 5
Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic indicators
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Gross domestic product
(annual rate of change) 3.0 3.3 5.2 1.1 3.7 5.1 2.2 0.5 3.8 0.3 -0.5
Public-sector balance
(% of GDP) -1.4 -1.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -2.4 -2.8 -2.5 -3.2 -3.3
Consumer price index
(December on December) 414.4 872.4 328.7 26.0 18.6 10.7 10.0 9.7 9.0 6.1 11.4
(898.3) (340.9) (25.9) (18.6) (10.3) (9.8) (9.5) (8.6) (5.9) (12.2)
Total public spending
(% of GDP) 17.5 17.8 18.0 18.2 18.1 18.6 19.3 20.5 20.6 19.8 …
Public-sector social
spending (% of GDP) 10.9 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.5 12.7 13.4 … … …
Source: ECLAC (2002b) and, for figures in brackets, ECLAC (2003).
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countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which spend an
average of some 8% or 9% of GDP. This suggests that
the way the financing and provision of health services
are organized has a strong influence on demand for
resources in the sector and on the results obtained
(White, 1995).
For this reason, one of the main challenges for the
reforms has been to create appropriate rules and
institutional arrangements for financing, and to find the
right way to tie financing to service provision (Londoño
and Frenk, 1997). Broadly speaking, there has been a
growing consensus on the advantages of separating
financing and provision. Concerning financing, and
given that the economic environment is increasingly
uncertain and that the demand for health services has a
large aleatory component characterized by the
uncertainty and diversity of risks, social insurance has
become an efficient way of organizing the financing of
health services (Buti, Franco and Pench, 2000).
Social health insurance needs to reconcile the
functions of insurance with those of solidarity,
distribution and universal coverage, and do so
irrespective of people’s employment situation. To
achieve this, it is necessary to devise rules for insurance
premiums, financing sources, the degree and level of
benefits and coverage offered, the population universe
included, and eligibility criteria. How all this is resolved
will greatly affect the amount of financing that the
health sector will require from the rest of society, the
degree to which the insurance and solidarity functions
are integrated, and the characteristics of the public-
private dynamic in financial management and service
provision.
In a social insurance context, irrespective of
whether such insurance is operated by public- and/or
private-sector managers, insurance functions have to
be reconciled with those of distribution if progress is
to be made towards universal coverage.6 The cost of
the premium per subscriber should be based not on risks
reflecting individual factors (such as age, sex or medical
history) but on the collective risks affecting the
population as a whole. This implies subsidies to cover
the cost of premiums, so that people will have access
to the benefits offered by the insurance regardless of
their individual risks and their ability to pay. The result
is solidarity between the sick and the well, between
young and old, and between high and low earners.
In this context, private spending on health care
should not be confused with private administration of
funds in the social security system, as here it is public
money that is being privately managed. Private
spending on health care is that which is carried out
outside the coverage of the social security system (so-
called out-of-pocket expenses, copayments, etc.). The
fact that such private spending is a large component of
total health spending reflects the weakness of social
protection systems. The greater the share of private
health spending in the total, the more exclusive and
inequitable health systems are (WHO, 2000).
When the structure of health spending in the Latin
American countries is compared with that in the
industrialized countries, the share of public spending
is found to be much higher in the latter. This reflects
the fact that their social health-care systems have
comprehensive universal coverage. In Latin America
and the Caribbean, on the other hand, private health
spending was about 60% of the total in 1995 (tables 6
and 7).
b) Solidarity in financing
Progress towards greater population coverage
involves higher subsidies to the sector, and thus greater
demand for financial resources. Better social health-
care provision will require efficiency improvements,
both in the allocation and management of resources so
that services can be improved, and in income-related
solidarity mechanisms, particularly cross-subsidies
from high-income to low-income sectors. While
efficiency improvements reduce costs and help lower
the demand for financial resources, solidarity
mechanisms tend to raise costs but enable the benefits
6
 The services concerned do not have to be provided by the public
sector, but can perfectly well be operated by the private sector.
TABLE 6
Selected regions and countries: Public-sector
health spending, 1995
As percentage
Spending per Of GDP Of total
capita (dollars)a health spending
Latin America and
the Caribbean 102 3.0 41.5
Canada 1314 7.0 71.0
OECD 1310 6.6 76.2
United States 1628 6.3 44.0
Source: World Health Organization (WHO) data.
a Purchasing power parity.
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of social security to be extended to more people (Van
de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992).
Solidarity among people with different income
levels in a social risk insurance context is created by
setting up solidarity funds to distribute subsidies that
compensate for differences in individual risk (figure 1).
Each individual contributes on the basis of earnings.
Premiums are determined by average risk and cost, and
insurance agencies receive payments that reflect their
risk portfolios. This system implies that some people
will contribute more than the average premium value
and others less, depending on risk and income levels.
The higher contributions of the former, combined with
revenue from other taxes, provide the resources for the
solidarity fund.
In a risk insurance context, this mechanism makes
it possible to retain the principle of equivalence between
contributions and benefits at the aggregate level, but
introduces solidarity to the extent that insureds receive a
benefits package that does not depend on their individual
contributions: if a user’s expected expenditure level is
above the average, the difference will be covered by
subsidies. This system also discourages risk selection,
since although insureds pay according to their means,
insurers’ revenues depend on their risk portfolios, which
in the final analysis are what determine the level of
spending expected.7
The proportion of the population covered by social
insurance also depends greatly on the source of
financing. When insurance is financed exclusively out
of wage contributions (which are the cornerstone of
social security systems in most of the region’s
countries), they exclude those unable to contribute or
the self-employed, who are covered mainly by the
public-sector network of providers and, to a lesser
extent, by the private sector. Any attempt to universalize
the population coverage of insurance must involve
widening the source of financing beyond compulsory
employee contributions and compelling self-employed
workers to contribute if they are in a position to do so.
Furthermore, the contributions of those unable to pay
must come out of general taxation. In this way,
contributors and non-contributors can be linked by
income solidarity mechanisms.
Given the budgetary constraints facing governments,
it is important for compulsory contributions to be among
the sources of solidarity financing. In Chile, for
example, the bulk of health system contributions do
nothing for income solidarity (only the 40% of
contributions going into public-sector insurance are
organized on this basis), so that the State has to obtain
the resources from elsewhere.8 When compulsory
contributions do not form part of solidarity financing,
7
 In the region, the Colombian reform includes funds of this type.
The reform now being discussed in Chile includes the creation of a
solidarity fund. In Europe, there have been experiences of this type
in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Israel also
has a solidarity fund mechanism.
FIGURE 1
Solidarity in an insurance context
Turn income-based contributions into
risk-adjusted payments
C = Contributions / IA = Insurance Agency
Source: Adapted from Titelman and Uthoff (2000).
8
 In Chile, compulsory social security contributions channelled
through private insurance schemes are based on individual risk and
there are no income solidarity mechanisms.
TABLE 7
Latin America and the Caribbean: Composition
of total health spending (public and private
sectors), by subsector, 1990 and 1995
(Percentages of total spending)
Health spending
Subsector 1990 1995
Public spending 43.4 41.5
Central government 12.2 15.8
Local government 7.4 8.5
Social security 23.8 17.2




Source: Molina, Pinto and others (2000); for 1990, based on Suárez
and others (1995); for 1995, based on PAHO/WHO (1998), table 54.
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the State has to take on a greater fiscal burden. If
solidarity financing needs are high, this can place a great
strain on the public budget.
An important issue, then, is the ability of those in
the system to pay. As was seen in the introductory
sections, the informal nature of the labour market in
the region’s countries has combined with an
increasingly volatile business cycle to produce large
shortfalls in contributions. This means, on the one hand,
that large sections of the population have lost their
insurance cover, with all the implied social costs. Again,
hiatuses in employment have resulted in a low
contribution density that is creating serious problems
of financial sustainability in the insurance system. In a
social risk insurance scheme, therefore, it is essential
to have supplementary mechanisms that ensure a good
contribution density, such as unemployment insurance
or special insurance to cover contributions during spells
of unemployment. Such supplementary insurance will
inevitably create additional demand for fiscal resources
or for supplementary insurance premiums (Velásquez,
2003).
c) Guaranteed benefits and fiscal responsibilities
One aspect that is the subject of great political and
technical controversy, but that is central to the working
of insurance systems and to the amount of financing
required, is the content of the guaranteed benefits
package. Although ethical, political, cultural and
medical factors are all involved as well, we shall confine
ourselves here to economic considerations.
Once society has decided on a set of entitlements
that are enforceable by all social insurance subscribers,
there automatically arises a financial obligation over
time. If the social insurance is financed out of
contributions and general taxation, the entitlement to
benefits causes contingent liabilities to arise for the
public sector. In other words, by creating an enforceable
social entitlement, the State commits itself to
guaranteeing this, which means that it is obliged to
finance it over time.
To finance contingent liabilities, it is necessary to
establish funding rules that guarantee provision of the
benefits offered and meet the requirements of fiscal
discipline so that public spending goals are met. In turn,
the ability to finance contingent liabilities is seriously
affected by the business cycle. One way of dealing with
this is to use specific stabilization funds that build up
resources during periods of economic growth and run
them down at times of recession, so that the availability
of financing is decoupled from immediate conditions
in the economy. This call on public resources is in
addition to the financial demands involved in achieving
the contribution density that insurance systems require.
Changes in contingent liabilities over time also play
a vital role in the financial sustainability of social
insurance. For example, benefit entitlements should
only be extended on the basis of rules and criteria that
reconcile the increase in provision with the need to keep
social expenditure trends within limits that are fiscally
sustainable over time, and thus strengthen the actuarial
components of social protection systems.9
d) Public-private mix, efficiency and cost restraint
Social insurance schemes that are to be
administered by public- and private-sector insurers, and
are to supply services through a network of public- and
private-sector providers, need to be designed with care.
A poorly conceived mix of public and private
involvement in social security management results in
inefficiencies in financial management and service
provision, leading to greater pressure on public
expenditure. The industrial organization of the sector
is thus crucial to the design of any reform.
The experience of reform in Latin America and
elsewhere suggests that a strong regulatory capability
is required if the private sector is to be involved
successfully in the health services market. The market
failures that affect financing and provision mean that,
in an unregulated or under-regulated market, private-
sector involvement results in a loss of efficiency and
equity. Where financing is concerned, the main problem
for equity and efficiency is the possibility that insurers
might be encouraged to carry out risk selection
(“skimming off”).
The Chilean experience illustrates this point.10
Private-sector insurers (ISAPRES) collect about 60% of
compulsory social health insurance contributions. These
institutions cater to only 25% of the population,
however, and the public sector is responsible for the
rest. When age and sex trends are observed, it transpires
that the poorest and oldest, comprising the bulk of the
riskiest population, tend to be in the public sector, while
9
 In setting benefits and entitlement rules, care needs to be taken not
to create incentives for evasion. Otherwise the number of subsidized
subscribers will tend to swell and the burden on the treasury or
taxpayers to increase.
10
 This does not imply that the Chilean model is the only one in the
region that has problems with equity and efficiency. Given the under-
regulation of the current public-private mix, however, it offers a
very good illustration of “skimming off”.
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the ISAPRE sector covers the youngest, the healthiest
and those with the highest incomes (tables 8 and 9).
As can be seen, the Chilean public-private mix
concentrates coverage of the worst financial and health
risks in the public sector, increasing the financial
requirements of that sector. Yet most compulsory
contributions go to the ISAPRE system, depriving the
treasury of funding. Accordingly, the State is
confronting a rising demand for health services, and its
financial burden is increasing as a result. The situation
has been compounded by a decline in contributions to
the redistributive social security system from the
highest-income population, and by implicit or explicit
State subsidies for private health care.
The demand for higher funding in the health sector
can also be offset greatly by efficiency improvements
involving better management of resources and cost
restraint in service provision. To achieve this, it is
important to improve the management of public
hospitals and the mechanisms whereby funding is
allocated to providers (prospective budgeting and
performance-related payments) and to make changes
to the care model. Most spending in the region goes on
curative rather than preventive care (table 10). One of
the most effective ways of containing costs is to improve
prevention, which means upgrading primary care
networks.
2. Pension system reforms
a) Organizing retirement saving
Structural reforms to pension systems11 have
brought about major changes in the relationship
between benefits and contributions. Most reforms make
greater or lesser use of individual capitalization schemes
(“pillars”).12 The individual capitalization pillar may
supplement or replace the unfunded pillar. In the region,
efforts have been made to combine the new full
individual capitalization pillars with the old unfunded
pillars. There have been changeover systems that have
shut down the public system and replaced it with a full
individual capitalization one (Chile, 1979-1981;
Mexico, 1995; Bolivia, 1996; El Salvador, 1996). There
are mixed systems that include a full individual
capitalization pillar as an integral part of a reformed
public-sector pillar (Argentina, 1993; Uruguay, 1995).
And there are parallel systems that have established a
full individual capitalization pillar as an option in
parallel with the reformed public-sector pillar (Peru,
1992; Colombia, 1993).
11
 Non-structural reforms improve the solvency of the public pension
system as a means of preserving it, and alter the benefits structure
to adapt it to the contribution capacity of subscribers. Among other
measures, these reforms have changed indexation rules, raised
retirement ages, lowered the replacement rate, imposed stricter access
conditions for disability and survivor’s pensions and non-
contributory pensions, abolished or restricted ex gratia or special
pensions for public servants and increased the number of years’
contributions required for pension entitlement (Mesa-Lago, 1999).
12
 These operate as individual saving accounts whose benefits depend
on the contributions actually made, which are for set amounts and
are capitalized in individual accounts. The value of the annuity is
calculated from the sum capitalized by the subscriber up to retirement
age, taking into account the life expectancy of the population. In the
unfunded system, benefits were defined and contributions could vary
in accordance with actuarial calculations; contributions were used
to finance the defined benefits of subscribers, which were not linked
to contributions and could be cross-subsidized.
TABLE 8
Chile: Financing sources for the health sector, 2000
Total
In billions of pesos In billions of dollars As %
Fiscal payments 613 221 1 048 21.0
Municipal payments 38 391 66 1.3
Corporate payments 184 311 315 6.3
Contributions 1 087 216 1 858 37.2
Public 444 937 761 15.2
Private 642 279 1 098 22.0
Out-of-pocket spending 935 923 1 600 32.0
Copayments 315 855 540 10.8
Pharmacy 288 219 493 9.9
Direct 331 849 567 11.4
Other 62 522 106 2.1
Total 2 921 584 4 933 100.0
Source: Chilean Ministry of Health data.
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From a fiscal standpoint, the structure of the
financing and calculation of pension system benefits
in each of these reforms is not neutral. By changing the
way benefits relate to contributions and by limiting the
scope for cross-subsidy among contributors (leaving
the State to finance the distributive function of the
system), the reforms affect fiscal liabilities.
b) Transition costs
The State has to accept liability for the costs of the
transition from one pillar to another (i.e., for
entitlements acquired under previous contracts) that
arise when contributions to unfunded public systems
are turned into contributions to individual savings
accounts.
How much this cost amounts to will depend on the
contingent liabilities associated with the current and
retired workforce, as determined by the contributions
paid into the old system and the benefits accrued (Uthoff
and Bravo, 1999; ECLAC, 1998). Their size can be
estimated in the form of a debt equivalent to the present
value of the future flow of benefits to which current
pensioners are entitled, and as the present value of the
future flow of benefits due to those currently in work
who have contributed to the old system. Amortizing
this debt requires complex actuarial calculations, but
what results is a fiscal liability that will swell the social
security deficit if not offset by fiscal financing. In Chile,
this debt was financed partly by primary fiscal saving
and partly by issuing bonos de reconocimiento,
certificates of entitlement to benefits accrued under the
old system. How and when this debt is financed will
depend on how the transition from one system to the
other is carried out. The authorities have to deal with
the fiscal liabilities of transition both by reallocating
spending and by increasing revenue.
After more than 20 years of reform, in which the
changeover has gradually been made from an unfunded
system to one of individual capitalization, the Chilean
experience is illuminating. The reformed pension
TABLE 9
Chile: Population distribution between the public health system and private health
insurance institutions (Isapres), by age and household quintile, 2000
Age Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Public Isapres Other Public Isapres Other Public Isapres Other Public Isapres Other Public Isapres Other
system system system system system
0-20 85.4 5.5 9.1 69.9 16.6 13.5 54.4 28.0 17.6 36.6 42.7 20.7 19.1 66.1 14.8
21-50 81.8 6.1 2.1 67.6 16.4 16.1 54.4 26.6 19.1 37.9 40.4 21.7 21.8 60.1 18.1
51-64 87.3 2.9 9.8 81.8 6.0 12.3 72.4 12.1 15.5 59.6 20.3 20.1 37.1 39.8 23.2
65 plus 89.5 0.8 9.7 91.1 1.1 7.8 89.4 1.6 9.0 79.4 5.9 14.8 55.5 21.8 22.7
Total 84.2 5.4 10.4 71.2 14.6 14.2 59.5 23.3 17.3 44.3 35.2 20.5 26.5 55.2 18.3
Source: Titelman (2000).
TABLE 10
Latin America (eight countries): Distribution of health spending by service type, 1995
(Percentages)
Country Preventive care Curative care Administration Other
Bolivia 2.8 61.8 10.4 25.0
Ecuador 2.3 83.4 5.5 8.8
El Salvador 7.8 71.4 8.2 12.6
Guatemala 4.0 77.6 10.5 7.9
Mexico 9.0 80.0 3.0 8.0
Nicaragua 17.5 75.6 6.3 0.6
Peru 5.6 64.6 6.8 23.0
Dominican Rep. 7.4 67.0 15.5 10.1
Average 7.0 72.6 8.3 12.1
Source: Molina, Pinto and others (2000), on the basis of studies of national accounts. Collaboration between the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO)/United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Partnerships for Health Reform.
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system has been sustained by an average increase in
the social security deficit of some 2% of GDP during
the first 20 years (Arenas de Mesa, 1999). This social
security deficit (figure 2) breaks down into i) an
operating deficit, reflecting payment of entitlements to
those in retirement; ii) amortization of the bonos de
reconocimiento, covering the entitlements of those who
participated in the old system during their working lives;
iii) payments to the armed forces pension systems, and
iv) guaranteed social benefits to protect those who are
indigent at retirement age (welfare pensions) and those
who, having participated in the system, have not been
able to build up enough capital for a socially acceptable
benefit (minimum pensions).
The pension system debt to be made explicit can
be large when a complete switch is made from an
unfunded to a funded pillar, depending on demographic
factors, the characteristics of coverage and eligibility
conditions of the superseded systems, the entitlements
that are established and the extent to which assets
without ownership rights are replaced by assets that do
carry such rights (Valdés, 2002). What part is made
explicit and reflected in liabilities for the treasury, like
those illustrated for Chile in figure 2, also depends on
the reform strategy followed. To avoid very high
operating costs and large liabilities in the form of bonos
de reconocimiento, it is possible to take measures like
the following before individually funded pillars are
introduced as part of the reform: i) change benefit rules
and eligibility conditions; ii) only partially introduce a
full individually funded capitalization pillar and
minimize the incentives to move to the new pillar; iii)
or include defined-contribution and notional
capitalization criteria for the unfunded systems as an
intermediate step in the transition, as has been done in
other cases.13
In most reforms, the extra fiscal burden has been
difficult to accommodate. In Argentina, for example,
the Government had to suspend indexation of the
prestación compensatoria (a benefit to compensate for
entitlements accrued by contributing to the old system)
and also of the aporte medio previsional obligatorio
(compulsory average pension contribution, or AMPO)
legally mandated as the basis for calculating
compensatory pensions. In Bolivia, the universal benefit
for over-65s provided for by the bono solidario
(solidarity bond, or BONOSOL) could not be covered;
FIGURE 2
Chile: State social security deficit, 1981-2001
Source: Arenas de Mesa, 1999.
13
 See Holzmann, 1997; ECLAC, 1998; Carvalho and Paiva, 2000;
Fox and Palmer, 2001.
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although the benefit was extended to all over-50s, its
value was reduced from US$ 250 to US$ 90. In Chile,
there has been extensive debate on the level of minimum
pensions, owing to their impact on fiscal expenditure;
as a way of controlling the spending they generate,
welfare pensions (PASIS) are provided under a quota
system which sets the maximum number that can be
granted each year (Gana, 2002).
c) Effects on the government budget
The idea behind redistributive financing is to
protect those whose contribution history does not entitle
them to pensions of their own. The increased
vulnerability of today’s workers to unemployment, the
scale of job turnover and the incidence of informal and
insecure employment mean that fewer and fewer people
are paying into contributory systems and contribution
density is low. Financing for the pensions of those
unable to generate savings of their own depends on
income sources such as cross-subsidy and/or general
taxation.
The scope for achieving solidarity through
contributions diminishes when a full individual
capitalization pillar is introduced. With this pillar, which
is always in a state of actuarial balance, a subscriber’s
benefits are equivalent to his or her contributions, duly
capitalized, and there are no cross-subsidies. With this
scheme, those who save enough are insured and those
who do not are underinsured. Application of the
equivalence principle to the full individual capitalization
pillar alone does not mean that those unable to contribute
much might not receive cross-subsidies from those who
can, within the reformed system. For this to happen,
structural reforms to pension systems need to include a
redistributive pillar to cover those workers. This pillar
can be financed from increased fiscal subsidies and
perhaps contributions. The basic problem with this
combination of pillars is that, if extremely generous
minimum and/or welfare benefits are provided, there
will be no incentive for people to remain in the
contributory pillars any longer than required for
entitlement to the guaranteed benefits. It is
indispensable, then, for such distortions to be corrected.
The coverage that a redistributive unfunded pillar
should have and the way it is financed are major
dilemmas for the current reforms. There is an extensive
debate over how enforceable entitlements really are,
whether they can be financed, and what incentives for
avoidance and evasion might be created by non-
contributory entitlements. One way of gauging the size
of the redistributive pillar is to simulate a defined-
contribution distributive pillar benefiting those who are
excluded from the individual saving pillar. This is
equivalent to having notional “solidarity accounts” for
each citizen, for pension purposes.
Table 11 gives simulations for Chile of the present
value of benefit payments guaranteed to current
pensioners (row 1), future generations (row 2) and the
total (row 3), and of the fiscal deficit flow involved in
amortizing the total debt on a straight-line basis (last row).
TABLE 11
Chile: Simulation of contingent liabilities represented by entitlements, and fiscal deficit
required to amortize thema
(Percentages)
Entitlement as percentage
of the average wage in
the economy 15 20 30
Population covered by
entitlements as percentage
of EAPb 35 45 55 35 45 55 35 45 55
Pensioners 5.2 6.7 8.1 6.9 8.9 10.8 10.3 13.3 16.2
Future generations 30.4 39.1 47.8 40.5 52.1 63.7 60.8 78.2 95.6
Total 35.6 45.8 56.9 47.4 61.0 74.5 70.1 91.5 111.8
Amortization of the debt
(fiscal deficit) 0.89 1.15 1.42 1.19 1.53 1.86 1.75 2.29 2.80
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of demographic parameters, coverage, contribution rates and enforceable entitlements estimated
at replacement rate.
a See Uthoff and Bravo (1999) for details of the methodology.
b EAP: economically active population.
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This method uses a discount rate equal to the rate of
wage growth. The population entitled to guaranteed
benefits is expressed as a percentage of the economically
active population (EAP): 35%, 45% and 55%. Benefits
are expressed as percentages of the average wage in the
economy (15%, 20% and 30%). Given the simplifying
assumptions,14 each of them has to be matched by an
actuarially balanced contribution rate. With these
suppositions, social security deficits for the welfare and
minimum pensions of those currently retired, which now
represent 0.4% of GDP (figure 2), will increase to 1.5%
of GDP once the generations now working retire.
Calculations by Arenas de Mesa (1999) for similar
benefits (minimum pension) yielded comparable results.
The calculations show that the percentage of the
population entitled to guaranteed benefits and the
replacement rate and/or notional contribution rate used
to quantify their entitlements have a significant influence
in determining contingent liabilities.
Calculations of contingent liabilities associated
with guaranteed benefits depend not only on the amount
of the benefits, expressed for example as replacement
rates for average wages in the economy and the
population covered. They are also affected by structural
factors associated with the potential ability of
subscribers to finance their own pensions, something
that is influenced in Latin America by the extent of
informal work, expressed in this methodology by the
share of the EAP accounted for by wage earners. Again,
they vary with demographic factors such as the
dependency ratio between over-60s and the 20 to 59-
year-old population and the average life expectancy of
those currently over 60. Since these factors vary greatly
from one country to another, the cost of similar benefits
may differ among them (table 12).
Acknowledging pension entitlements for those who
are underinsured or uninsured with regard to the
individual capitalization pillar, and quantifying the
contingent liabilities their demand represents, implies
spelling out how the individual capitalization and
defined-contribution pillar may be supplemented by an
unfunded defined-benefit system, and how much
financing is needed to cover such people. There is
currently a debate as to whether solidarity should be
financed from a tax on work (contributions), general
taxation or a mixture of the two. In any event, the
existence of guaranteed benefits means that the design
of new systems should be carefully analysed, so that if
they include distributive pillars, these do not create
incentives for evasion or avoidance of contributions. Care
is also needed to see that the way they are financed does
not affect employment, whether directly by increasing
the cost of contributions or indirectly by creating fiscal
imbalances and undermining the competitiveness of the
economy (ILO, 2001b; Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999).
d) Contribution density and contingent liabilities
Ultimately, if people are to be able to use an
individual saving plan system to smooth consumption
14
 Three simplifying assumptions are used: i) the percentage of the
population eligible to receive guaranteed benefits remains unchanged
over time; ii) the eligible working population accrues solidarity
contributions from the age of 20 until retirement, at a rate that is
actuarially correct to finance the guaranteed benefits; iii) the eligible
population that is already in retirement receives a solidarity pension
from the age of 60, at a replacement rate that is actuarially balanced
with the value of the benefits guaranteed (Uthoff and Bravo, 1999).
TABLE 12
Latin America (four countries): Comparison of contingent liabilities represented
 by entitlements, and fiscal deficit required to amortize them
(Percentages)
Estimated for the 45% of the EAP entitled to a benefit,
at a replacement rate of 20%a
Debt towards current generation Debt towards future generations Fiscal deficit that would amortize
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) the debt (% of GDP)
Bolivia 11.4 81.6 2.33
El Salvador 9.5 63.2 1.82
Mexico 8.7 62.0 1.77
Chile 8.9 52.1 1.53
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of demographic parameters, coverage, contribution rates and enforceable entitlements estimated
at replacement rate.
a As percentage of average wage.
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over their lives, it is necessary to project the amount and
density of contributions made while they are enrolled in
the system during their working years. This will determine
whether they receive satisfactory benefits or not. With
defined-contribution full individual capitalization pillars,
the contribution density of individuals, which depends
on their personal saving capacity, will largely determine
whether they end their working lives fully insured,
underinsured or uninsured. Again, if contribution density
is not known in advance, it will be difficult to quantify
the solidarity contributions that the State has to capitalize
(contingent liabilities) to finance the guaranteed pension
in an actuarially balanced way.15
Contribution density is affected by different risks,
such as those of disability and death,16 and by
employment instability as manifested in changing levels
of unemployment and informal work. In societies where
there is no unemployment insurance and where informal
workers contribute little,17 contingent liabilities are
sensitive to changes in the business cycle. Using
indicators from the International Association of Pension
Funds’ Supervisory Organisations, table 13 shows a
number of countries in which the percentage of
subscribers is low in relation to the EAP, indicating that
coverage of the capitalization pillars is low as well.18
Again, the low proportion of subscribers actually paying
in shows indirectly that contribution density may be
relatively low. The lack of market instruments to ensure
high contribution density is an obstacle to low-income
sectors, in particular, benefiting from social protection
in the absence of redistributive financing. Although there
have been new initiatives to promote unemployment
insurance, these are still at an early stage and do not take
account of other forms of labour market adjustment such
as rising informal activity, in which contribution density
is usually low.
By and large, the evidence indicates that workers’
contribution levels are closely linked to the structure
of the labour market and are not greatly influenced by
the poverty levels of the households they belong to.
Informal working strengthens the factors working
against high contribution density. The contribution rate
for informal activities has been holding fairly steady at
a rate much lower than that for formal activities.
Table 14 illustrates the situation in Chile.
16
 Also, many people work on an own-account basis and opt for
other types of saving that are more easily accessible should
contingencies arise (Coraggio, 2003).
17
 Because people have different needs over the life cycle that
compete with saving for old age.
18
 Records of pension system subscribers and contributors leave
much to be desired, as the former are sometimes double-counted
and the contribution density of the latter is not measured. The Chilean
authorities have treated this problem as one of vital importance.
Contribution density has been shown to be much lower than was
expected when the system was established, and there are large
variations by sex and age group. In 2001, the average contribution
density of individual capitalization system subscribers was 41%,
while the average for system contributors was 59%. This means
that over 12 months, subscribers and contributors actually only paid
4.9 and 7 months of contributions, respectively (Government of
Chile, 2003).
15
 Benefits may be different, as they vary with the contributions
made from a welfare pension to a minimum pension for those who
qualify as eligible contributors (Uthoff, 2002).
TABLE 13
Latin America (eight countries): Indirect
indicators of contribution density
(Percentages)
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Reforms to social security systems involve the difficult
task of reconciling entitlements and needs with
financial constraints and shortfalls. Fiscal constraints
limit the scope for financing the huge social demand
in our countries. Again, the design and implementation
of reforms have a significant impact on the demand
for fiscal resources, as they affect the efficiency with
which resources are allocated and managed, the way
solidarity mechanisms are financed and the costs of
transition.
Demand for social security services is influenced
by cyclical economic factors and by variables of a more
structural nature. It is largely through the labour market
that the business cycle influences financing sources and
the demands made on social security systems. The
unfavourable evolution of the labour market in the
countries of Latin America has created greater
challenges for social security reform.
In economic environments characterized by greater
uncertainty and volatility, and thus by higher social risk,
social security reforms need to reconcile the functions
of insurance and saving with those of redistribution and
solidarity. This is crucial if the idea is to move towards
universal coverage and benefits.
In the case of the health sector, social insurance is
becoming an efficient way to organize financing. To
move away from the current segmentation of the
population among different health subsystems,
membership of an insurance scheme needs to be
decoupled from the occupational position of the
individual. In other words, insurance needs to cover
both employed and self-employed workers and those
unable to contribute. This means establishing solidarity
funds financed out of contributions and taxation. To
the extent that social insurance management might
involve private-sector administration of resources, it is
vital to avoid the problems of risk selection. When
private-sector administrators are involved in financing
and providing social security services, it is crucial to
have a good regulatory framework in place to ensure
that these organizations have the same rights and duties
as public-sector administrators.
Progress towards universal coverage in a social




Chile: Percentage of workers paying into the individual private capitalization system,
by poverty level and labour market segment, 1992 and 2000




Domestic service 21.5 22.6 42.8 37.5
Other 21.1 25.9 26.2 25.9
Formal sector 64.0 72.0 76.4 75.1
Total 43.3 52.1 55.6 54.5
2000
Informal sector
Domestic service 7.4 18.2 40.6 36.6
Other 9.3 18.9 28.2 26.6
Formal sector 43.5 67.5 79.5 77.8
Total 25.9 45.3 59.7 54.5
Source: ECLAC tabulations, using data from the Chilean National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN).
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on the public sector. The costs borne by the State may be
very considerable, depending on the nature of the benefits
covered by the insurance, the amounts of minimum and
welfare pensions, the contribution density guarantee and
the extent of subsidy for solidarity purposes.
As the benefits offered by social security systems
turn into enforceable entitlements, they become
contingent liabilities for the State and have to be
financed irrespective of the vagaries of the business
cycle. If it is to support social policy, macroeconomic
policy needs to concern itself not just with smoothing
out the business cycle, but also with creating fiscal
expenditure rules that provide scope for countercyclical
public spending. Rules to link fiscal goals with
structural parameters rather than with the current
position of the economy provide a good underpinning
for social policy.
Another important issue is the calculation of
contingent liabilities and their evolution over time. Such
liabilities are affected by three factors. First, by the
amount and volume of benefits guaranteed. Second, by
significant changes over the business cycle in the
number of people who can and cannot contribute, as
problems stemming from low contribution density
result in people who were apparently insured being left
uninsured. Third, by the way solidarity is financed: if
workers’ and employers’ contributions are not part of
this, the cost for the treasury will tend to rise.
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